zip: Unbounded Symlink-Target Handling Can Abort Or Exhaust Memory During Extraction
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 9.0.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
The zip crate for Rust, which reads and writes ZIP archives, is affected, and any application that extracts untrusted ZIP files with it can be crashed by a specially crafted small archive. The crafted archive forces a huge memory allocation during symbolic link handling, which aborts the process and can be repeated to cause denial of service.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
zip is a zip library for Rust that supports reading and writing simple ZIP files. From 1.3.0 until 9.0.0, ZipArchive::extract in src/read/mod.rs calls Vec::with_capacity for a symbolic link target using the attacker-controlled ZIP64 uncompressed_size before reading entry data. A small archive can request an impossible capacity, causing the infallible allocation path to abort the process before the entry is validated. The failure cannot be contained with catch_unwind or a worker thread, allowing repeated denial of service in archive-processing applications. This issue is fixed in version 9.0.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- zip-rs zip2
From 1.3.0 · fixed in 9.0.0
- zipcrates.io
From 1.3.0 · fixed in 9.0.0