Alarm data length not validated against received frame length
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.0.3
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
P-Net, a software stack for PROFINET industrial communication devices, is affected when it is built with an application alarm callback that uses the reported data length. An attacker on the adjacent network who has an established Application Relationship could send a short alarm frame that causes the application to read past its receive buffer, potentially leading to crashes or information exposure.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
P-Net before 1.0.3 passes the application alarm callback a data length derived from the variable part length field of a received RTA alarm frame without checking it against the length of the received frame. A short frame can make the callback receive a length of up to 65507 bytes. An application that copies the reported number of bytes reads past the end of the receive buffer. The attacker must have established an Application Relationship and requires ADJACENT network access. Applications that do not use the alarm data are not affected.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- RT-Labs P-Net
fixed in 1.0.3