An unrestricted file upload vulnerability exists in the campaign import feature of Mautic 7.
- Published
- Last modified
- Status
- published
- Known exploitation
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 7.2.2
- Public exploit
- None on Exploit-DB
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
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Decision points from CISA's Vulnrichment, assessed (SSVC 2.0.3).
SSVC documentationSummary
Mautic 7 is affected, specifically its campaign import feature. An authenticated user who is allowed to import campaigns can upload files that are placed unchecked into a publicly reachable web directory, which on common Apache setups can lead to running code on the server with access to configuration, secrets, and contact data.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
An unrestricted file upload vulnerability exists in the campaign import feature of Mautic 7. When processing an uploaded campaign archive, the application copies the bundled asset files into a publicly accessible media directory without restricting their file names or types. An authenticated user with permission to create campaign imports can exploit this through the user interface or the API (/api/campaigns/import) to place arbitrary files, including server-side scripts, in the web root. Administrator privileges are not required. On web servers that honor per-directory configuration, such as the default Apache setup of the official Mautic Docker image, this leads to remote code execution with the privileges of the web server user, including access to the Mautic configuration, application secrets, and contact data.
Affected versions
- mautic/core
From 7.0.0 · fixed in 7.2.2