Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in hMailServer
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Cross-site request forgery in the REST API of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.6 allows a remote attacker to make an authenticated user's browser perform a state-changing request. The REST API accepts HTTP Basic authentication and answers a browser with a Basic sign-in box; a browser caches the credential once the box is answered and sends it with later requests to that origin, including a top-level form post from another site, and the server reads a request body whatever its declared content type. The cross-site protection covered only the cookie session (a header a cross-site form cannot set, and a SameSite=Strict cookie); HTTP Basic was not held to it. A page under an attacker's control, visited by a user whose browser holds a cached Basic credential for the REST API - typically an administrator who signed in through the box - could therefore cause a state-changing request such as creating a domain, an account or an API key, or changing a setting, with the victim's credential. The attacker cannot read the cross-origin response, so the forgery is blind.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Progressive Robot Ltd hMailServer
From 6.0.0 · through 6.3.6