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CVE-2026-114349EUVD-2026-112176GHSA-6RR8-5QQ5-GQ73

Apache Kafka: Denial of service via unbounded memory allocation when decoding compressed record batches

Published
Last modified
published
Not listed in CISA KEV
Fix
Fixed in 2.5.0, 4.0.0
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub

Summary

An authenticated user with write access to a topic can crash Apache Kafka brokers and consumers by sending a small, specially crafted compressed produce request that forces an enormous memory allocation. Because the flaw can also stop log compaction broker-wide once the bad record is stored on disk, the impact is loss of service availability, with no data disclosure or alteration.

Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.

Read the original description

When a broker decodes a compressed record batch, the per-record decoder reads a declared body size from the decompressed stream and allocates a buffer of that size before validating it against the bytes available or any configured limit. The size is attacker-controlled, and the batch CRC does not constrain it, so a small (around 90-byte), CRC-valid compressed produce request can declare a body size of up to about 2 GiB and force the broker to attempt that allocation, raising OutOfMemoryError. The record size limit (max.message.bytes), the request size limit, and client/broker quotas bound only the compressed wire size, not the declared decompressed size. Impact: An authenticated principal with Write on a topic can crash broker request-handler threads (reached when a batch's codec differs from the topic's compression.type and records are re-encoded) and any consumer that fetches the record, denying service. On brokers started with -XX:+ExitOnOutOfMemoryError, a common hardening, a single crafted request terminates the broker JVM. More seriously, a crafted record  is accepted at ingest and written to disk; when the log-cleaner later reads it on a compacted topic, the OutOfMemoryError (an Error, not an Exception) terminates the cleaner thread, which is not restarted. With the default of a single cleaner thread, log compaction then stops for the entire broker, including the internal __consumer_offsets and __transaction_state topics, and the condition persists across restarts until the offending record is removed. The impact is availability only; no data is disclosed or altered. Mitigation: Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0, and set max.decompressed.message.bytes (at the broker and/or topic level) to a bounded value appropriate for your workload. Upgrading alone is not sufficient: for backward compatibility this configuration defaults to an effectively unlimited value (about 2 GiB), so a broker remains exposed until the limit is set. Choose a value at or slightly above the largest legitimate decompressed record your applications produce, and comfortably below the broker heap divided by the number of request-handler and cleaner threads. Until you can upgrade and configure the limit, restrict Write access to trusted producers; quotas and max.message.bytes do not mitigate this issue. Resolution: From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: the broker validates a record's declared decompressed body size against max.decompressed.message.bytes before allocating, on the produce-validation, log-compaction, and timestamp-lookup paths, and rejects oversized or negative sizes with InvalidRecordException. Operators must set this configuration to a bounded value to be protected, as its default is effectively unlimited.

Timeline

  1. CVE published
  2. First seen by cve.now
  3. Record last updated

Affected versions

  • org.apache.kafka:kafka_2.11

    From 0.11.0.0 · fixed in 2.5.0

  • org.apache.kafka:kafka_2.12

    From 0.11.0.0 · fixed in 4.0.0

  • org.apache.kafka:kafka_2.13

    From 2.4.0 · through 4.1.2; From 4.2.0 · through 4.2.1; From 4.3.0 · through 4.3.1

References 2

kafka.apache.org

lists.apache.org