HTTP::Headers::ActionPack versions before 0.10 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via Accept-Language ranges matched as regular expressions
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.10
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
HTTP::Headers::ActionPack for Perl, as used by applications that pass untrusted Accept-Language headers to its language selection, is affected. A remote attacker can send a crafted header that consumes excessive CPU time or causes the language selection function to crash.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
HTTP::Headers::ActionPack versions before 0.10 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via Accept-Language ranges matched as regular expressions. _language_match interpolates each Accept-Language range into the pattern `/^$range\-/i` without escaping it, so regular expression syntax in the header reaches the regex engine. A 12-byte range such as `(a?|b?){26}z` backtracks for seconds, and each increment of the quantifier doubles the time. An invalid range such as `(` fails to compile. A remote attacker can exhaust CPU, or make choose_language die, in any application that passes an untrusted Accept-Language header to it.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- HTTP-Headers-ActionPack
fixed in 0.10