Electron: HID and USB permission checks can be attributed to the wrong origin
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, 45.0.0-alpha.5
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to versions 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, and 45.0.0-alpha.5, hid and usb permission checks made from an iframe caused setPermissionCheckHandler to receive the top-level frame's origin and details instead of the requesting frame's. An application that delegated hid or usb to a cross-origin untrusted iframe and allowed device access with origin-based logic could therefore grant that embedded frame access intended for the top-level page. This issue is fixed in versions 42.11.3, 43.7.0, 44.3.0, and 45.0.0-alpha.5.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- electron electron
fixed in 42.11.3; From 43.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 43.7.0; From 44.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 44.3.0; From 45.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 45.0.0-alpha.5
- electronnpm
From 45.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 45.0.0-alpha.5
- electronnpm
From 44.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 44.3.0
- electronnpm
From 43.0.0-alpha.1 · fixed in 43.7.0
- electronnpm
fixed in 42.11.3