odf-kit: HTML injection leading to XSS in odtToHtml() via unescaped style attribute values
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.14.2
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
odf-kit allows users to generate, fill, read, and convert OpenDocument Format files (.odt, .ods) in TypeScript and JavaScript. Starting in version 0.6.0 and prior to version 0.14.2, he renderer has an `escapeHtml()` helper and applies it consistently to text content and to attribute values — `href`, `src`, `alt`, `id`, `data-author`, `data-date`, citation text all go through it. The inline CSS strings do not. In `renderTextSpan` (`dist/odt/to-html/html-renderer.js:195`), the value of e.g. `fo:color` is copied from the document into `style.fontColor` verbatim by the parser (`extractSpanStyle`, read/parser.js:348), then concatenated raw into the attribute. A `"` in the value terminates the attribute early. The same unescaped `style="${...}"` pattern appears at roughly ten other emission sites: paragraph and heading (`paragraphStyleToCss`), table cells and rows (`cellStyleToCss`, `rowStyleToCss`), `<col>`, and the image style attribute. The affected source attributes include `fo:color`, `fo:background-color`, `fo:text-shadow`, `fo:letter-spacing`, `fo:font-family` (via both direct and font-face resolution), `fo:margin-*`, `fo:padding-*`, `fo:line-height`, `fo:border*`, and `style:vertical-align`. Version 0.14.2 contains a patch.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- GitHubNewbie0 odf-kit
From 0.6.0 · fixed in 0.14.2