OGNL stricter-invocation block list bypass via java.lang.reflect reflection proxies
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.4.13
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
OGNL is an Object Graph Navigation Library for Java. Prior to 3.4.13, the optional stricter-invocation mode in OgnlRuntime.invokeMethod checks the declaring class of the method that OGNL invokes but does not block java.lang.reflect.Method, java.lang.reflect.Constructor, or java.lang.reflect.Field. An attacker-controlled expression can invoke one of these reflection objects as a proxy for a method on a blocked class, causing the real operation to execute inside JDK reflection without passing through the stricter-invocation check again. Exploitation requires an application to evaluate untrusted OGNL expressions, use the default or an equivalently permissive MemberAccess that permits reflection, and rely on stricter invocation as a sandbox. Applications using a restrictive MemberAccess, including Apache Struts with SecurityMemberAccess, are not affected by this bypass. This issue is fixed in 3.4.13.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- orphan-oss ognl
fixed in 3.4.13
- ognl:ognlMaven
fixed in 3.4.13