Moov signedxml: Unauthenticated denial of service in exclusive XML canonicalization
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.4.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Moov signedxml is a pure Go library for processing signed XML documents. Prior to 1.4.1, ExclusiveCanonicalization in exclusivecanonicalization.go copies the complete accumulated namespace map at every nested element before reference digest or signature checks. Attacker-controlled XML containing deeply nested elements with many unused namespace declarations causes quadratic allocation growth with depth and linear growth with prefixes per level, allowing a comparatively small document to consume multiple gigabytes of memory and terminate the process. The condition is reachable through ValidateReferences without a valid signature, matching certificate, or prior authentication, and it does not bypass signature verification. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- moov-io signedxml
fixed in 1.4.1
- github.com/moov-io/signedxmlGo
fixed in 1.4.1