SSRF in Harbor webhook delivery allows ProjectAdmin to reach internal services
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.15.3, 2.14.5, 2.13.6
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Harbor, an open-source container registry, is affected across a wide range of versions in its webhook delivery component. A project administrator can point a webhook at internal or link-local addresses, causing Harbor to send requests into the private network and potentially exposing responses such as cloud metadata or other restricted internal resources to project members.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
A wide range of Harbor versions allow SSRF via its webhook delivery component which does not properly validate web hook target addresses, allowing usage of private and link-local IP ranges. An authenticated attacker with ProjectAdmin permissions can configure a webhook policy pointing to a private internal address. When a project event fires, Harbor jobservice makes unauthenticated outbound HTTP POST requests to the target. If the target answers with an error status, the response body is written to the webhook execution log, which project members can read, potentially exposing cloud metadata or other network-restricted resources.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- Harbor Harbor
From 2.15.0 · fixed in 2.15.3
- Harbor Harbor
From 2.14.0 · fixed in 2.14.5
- Harbor Harbor
From 1.7.0 · fixed in 2.13.6