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CVE-2026-108362GHSA-PJ2X-5WQV-FH57

Privasys attested TLS accepted evidence from any unrevoked TEE platform (diversion attack)

Published
Last modified
Status
published
Known exploitation
Not listed in CISA KEV
Fix
Fixed in 0.11.0
Public exploit
None on Exploit-DB
CISA SSVC
  • Exploitation: none
  • Automatable: no
  • Technical impact: total
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Decision points from CISA's Vulnrichment, assessed (SSVC 2.0.3).

SSVC documentation

Summary

Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Prior to 0.11.0, TEE attestation evidence in Privasys attested TLS is accepted without requiring an explicitly authorized platform identity. When a network attacker can forge evidence or extract attestation secrets from a compromised unrevoked platform, the verifier accepts valid measurements from a different unrevoked TEE platform as though they came from the intended Attester. The attacker can impersonate the attested TLS endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.0.

Affected versions

  • Privasys ra-tls-clients

    fixed in 0.11.0

References 3

GitHub · Privasys/ra-tls-clients