CVE-2026-108362GHSA-PJ2X-5WQV-FH57
Privasys attested TLS accepted evidence from any unrevoked TEE platform (diversion attack)
- Published
- Last modified
- Status
- published
- Known exploitation
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.11.0
- Public exploit
- None on Exploit-DB
CISA SSVC
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
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Decision points from CISA's Vulnrichment, assessed (SSVC 2.0.3).
SSVC documentationSummary
Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Prior to 0.11.0, TEE attestation evidence in Privasys attested TLS is accepted without requiring an explicitly authorized platform identity. When a network attacker can forge evidence or extract attestation secrets from a compromised unrevoked platform, the verifier accepts valid measurements from a different unrevoked TEE platform as though they came from the intended Attester. The attacker can impersonate the attested TLS endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.0.
Affected versions
- Privasys ra-tls-clients
fixed in 0.11.0