Apache CXF: The attachment header size and count limits can be bypassed, which allows denial of service through memory exhaustion.
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- The rating the maker of the software gives it. Shown when it differs from the CVSS level.What do these mean? →
- Low (apache)
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.2.4, 4.1.9, 3.6.13
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
In Apache CXF, the parser for multipart/MTOM attachment part headers did not fully enforce the configured attachment-max-header-size (default 300 characters) and attachment-headers-max-count (default 500) limits. The size limit was applied only to each physical line, not to a header value built from continuation lines or to the combined values of a repeated header. The count limit was checked against the number of distinct header names, not the total number of header lines. A remote, unauthenticated attacker could send a multipart request with very large folded or repeated part headers. The server would then allocate memory without bound, causing a denial of service. Users are recommended to upgrade to versions 4.2.4 or 4.1.9 or 3.6.13, which fix this issue.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- org.apache.cxf:cxf-core
From 4.2.0 · fixed in 4.2.4; From 4.0.0 · fixed in 4.1.9; fixed in 3.6.13