SMP race in `thread_idx_alloc()` lets concurrent `k_object_alloc(K_OBJ_THREAD)` callers share a kernel-object permission slot

Summary

In Zephyr's userspace dynamic-objects subsystem, thread_idx_alloc() in kernel/userspace/userspace.c allocated a new thread permission index from the global _thread_idx_map[] bitmap without holding lists_lock. On SMP systems, two user-mode threads invoking the k_object_alloc(K_OBJ_THREAD) syscall concurrently can both observe the same low free bit, perform the same non-atomic RMW to clear it, and return the identical tidx. The two newly created K_OBJ_THREAD objects are then assigned the same thread_id, so the two user threads alias a single bit position in every kernel object's perms[] bitfield: any subsequent grant of access on a kernel object to one thread is implicitly a grant to the other, defeating userspace ACL isolation. A secondary lost-update window between the unlocked &=~BIT() in alloc and the locked |= BIT() in thread_idx_free() can also leak entries from the thread-index pool. The defect is reachable from any user-mode thread via the unrestricted __syscall k_object_alloc and is gated on CONFIG_USERSPACE, CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS, and CONFIG_SMP. The flaw was introduced when the per-thread permission index was added in 2018 and is present in every release up to and including v4.4.0. Fixed by holding lists_lock across the bitmap RMW and the permissions clear (and inlining the obj_list traversal that previously took the lock itself).

Timeline

1. Jul 25, 2026, 1:23 PM UTCCVE published
2. Jul 27, 2026, 2:34 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total

3. Oct 15, 2026, 10:10 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• zephyr

  From 2.0.0 · fixed in 4.4.2

References 2