Use-after-free in Zephyr native TCP `net_tcp_foreach()` due to dropping `tcp_lock` during the callback

Summary

Zephyr's native TCP stack iterates the global connection list in net_tcp_foreach() (subsys/net/ip/tcp.c) using the SYS_SLIST_FOR_EACH_CONTAINER_SAFE macro, which caches a pointer to the next list node. Prior to this fix the function released tcp_lock while invoking the per-connection callback and re-acquired it afterwards. During that window a concurrent tcp_conn_release(), running on the dedicated TCP work-queue thread when a connection's reference count drops to zero (e.g. a remote peer closing or resetting the connection), can remove and k_mem_slab_free() the cached next connection. When the iterator advances it dereferences the freed (and possibly reallocated) slab memory — a use-after-free that can crash the system (denial of service) and, if the slot has been reused, cause the callback to operate on an attacker-influenced object (potential information disclosure or further fault). net_tcp_foreach() is reached in production via the net conn network shell command and via net_tcp_close_all_for_iface() on interface-down; the freeing side is driven by ordinary TCP traffic. The fix moves the connection/context teardown in tcp_conn_release() inside the tcp_lock critical section and keeps tcp_lock held across the callback in net_tcp_foreach(). The defect was introduced with the modern (TCP2) stack in 2020 and affects releases up to and including v4.4.0.

Timeline

1. Jun 15, 2026, 2:16 PM UTCCVE published
2. Jun 15, 2026, 4:06 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial

3. Oct 15, 2026, 10:09 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• zephyr

  From 3.6.0 · fixed in 4.3.1; From 4.4.0 · fixed in 4.4.1

References 2