Langflow: OS command injection (RCE) via arbitrary command in MCP stdio server configuration

Summary

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Before Langflow 1.10.3, the MCP stdio transport launched whatever command / args a user put in an MCP server configuration, with no allowlist and (before 1.10.3) wrapped in bash -c "exec {command} ...". Any user able to reach the MCP server settings ("Settings → MCP Servers → Add MCP Server", POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{server_name}) or to build a flow with the MCP Tools component could add a "server" whose command is an arbitrary OS command (touch, rm -rf, a reverse shell, ...). The command runs on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user as soon as Langflow tries to connect to the server (listing servers, loading tools, running the flow) — even when the UI then reports that the stdio server failed to start. With the default LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true, GET /api/v1/auto_login hands out a token without credentials, so on an exposed instance running the default configuration this is reachable without an account. AUTO_LOGIN is documented as a development-only setting; with it disabled, any authenticated (non-admin) user can exploit it. This issue is fixed in Langflow 1.10.3, langflow-base 0.10.3, and lfx 1.10.3.

Timeline

1. Oct 5, 2026, 8:16 PM UTCCVE published
2. Oct 6, 2026, 2:36 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total

3. Oct 9, 2026, 7:55 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• langflow-ai langflow

  From 1.1.2 · fixed in 1.10.3

• langflow-ai langflow-base

  From 0.1.2 · fixed in 0.10.3

• langflow-ai lfx

  fixed in 1.10.3

• langflowPyPI

  From 1.1.2 · fixed in 1.10.3

• langflow-basePyPI

  From 0.1.2 · fixed in 0.10.3

• lfxPyPI

  fixed in 1.10.3

References 9