Plane: Hardcoded SECRET_KEY and LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY shipped in aio/cli community deployment manifests — session forgery and live-server auth bypass
- Published
- Last modified
- Status
- published
- Known exploitation
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.4.0
- Public exploit
- None on Exploit-DB
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: total
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Decision points from CISA's Vulnrichment, assessed (SSVC 2.0.3).
SSVC documentationSummary
Plane is an open-source project management tool. Prior to 1.4.0, the deployments/aio/community/ and deployments/cli/community/ manifests provide fixed, publicly known SECRET_KEY and LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY defaults that remain active when operators do not override them. The top-level setup.sh randomizes secrets only for the development Docker Compose path, leaving unchanged aio and cli community deployments with shared production secrets. Knowledge of SECRET_KEY enables attackers to forge Django-signed values and compromise accounts or sessions. Knowledge of LIVE_SERVER_SECRET_KEY bypasses live-service authentication on unchanged community deployments. This issue is fixed in 1.4.0.
Affected versions
- makeplane plane
fixed in 1.4.0