Ente: Accepted emergency contact can bypass the recovery notice period
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.1.18, 2026.07.09
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Ente provides end-to-end encrypted cloud services and security tools. Prior to server image 2026.07.09, the POST /emergency-contacts/approve-recovery endpoint authorized approval using a client-supplied userID and updated an emergency recovery session using only its client-supplied recovery-session UUID. An accepted emergency contact could submit the contact's own identifier, transition the victim's session from WAITING to READY, clear wait_till, retrieve recovery information, and continue account recovery before the owner-configured notice period expired. Exploitation of the approval bypass required the victim to have previously added and accepted the attacker as an emergency contact, and it did not create recovery rights for an arbitrary account. Separately, the same insufficiently scoped update pattern affected the reject and stop recovery transitions, allowing a user who knew another recovery-session UUID to potentially cancel a session to which the user was not a party. This issue is fixed in server image 2026.07.09.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- ente ente
fixed in 0.1.18
- ente ghcr.io/ente/server
fixed in 2026.07.09