Nx daemon and plugin worker sockets are accessible to other local users
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 22.7.9, 23.1.2
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 14.6.0 until 22.7.9 and 23.1.2, Nx creates Unix domain sockets for its daemon and isolated plugin workers in shared temporary locations without owner-only directory and socket permissions. Another unprivileged local account on a shared build server, developer host, or multi-user container can discover and connect to a running socket because the transport performs no authentication and relies on filesystem containment. The daemon's PROCESS_IN_BACKGROUND request accepts a module path and invokes its default export, allowing a caller that controls a file to execute code as the account running Nx; other handlers can expose workspace file contents, project graphs, and task hashes. Disabling the daemon alone does not remove the vulnerable plugin-worker sockets, while single-user machines without another local account are not exposed. This issue is fixed in versions 22.7.9 and 23.1.2.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- nrwl nx
From 14.6.0 · fixed in 22.7.9; From 23.0.0 · fixed in 23.1.2
- nxnpm
From 14.6.0 · fixed in 22.7.9
- nxnpm
From 23.0.0 · fixed in 23.1.2