MISP Reflected XSS in Taxonomy Tag Confirmation Forms
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.5.48
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
MISP contains a reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the legacy taxonomy tag management confirmation forms (add tag and disable tag). The affected forms echoed a user-supplied tag name value from the request unescaped into the rendered HTML output. An attacker who can induce a site administrator to visit a crafted URL containing a malicious tag name parameter can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the administrator's browser session. Preconditions: • The target must be running a MISP instance with the legacy taxonomy tag confirmation views enabled. • The victim must be an authenticated site administrator. • The victim must navigate to the attacker-crafted URL (e.g., via a phishing link). Security impact: • Execution of arbitrary client-side script in the context of the administrator's browser. • Potential theft of session tokens, CSRF tokens, or other sensitive data accessible from the page. • Potential for performing privileged actions on behalf of the administrator within the MISP interface. Affected versions: <2.5.48.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- MISP MISP
fixed in 2.5.48