nexi Alpha Bank for WooCommerce <= 2.2.0 - Unauthenticated Payment Confirmation Forgery via Empty Shared Secret
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
The nexi Alpha Bank for WooCommerce plugin, a WordPress payment gateway add-on for WooCommerce stores, is affected. An unauthenticated attacker could forge payment confirmation notifications to mark orders as paid when the shared secret was never configured, and could also push pending orders into a failed state.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
The Payment Gateway WordPress plugin through 2.2.0 does not ensure a shared secret is configured before using it to authenticate the bank's payment-notification callback, allowing unauthenticated attackers to forge a valid notification and mark any WooCommerce order as paid on installs where the secret has not been set, and the same callback lets them move any pending order to a failed state whether or not the secret is configured.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- Unknown Payment Gateway
through 2.2.0