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CVE-2026-102721GHSA-WVC9-5M9H-RVXC

A TFTP server that answers with a short ERROR packet makes the client read up to 64 bytes past the received datagram.

Published
Last modified
published
Not listed in CISA KEV
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
  • Exploitation: none
  • Automatable: yes
  • Technical impact: partial

Summary

A TFTP server that answers with a short ERROR packet makes the client read up to 64 bytes past the received datagram. Each receive path checks only that the datagram is at least four bytes long (nxd_tftp_client.c:1229, 1521, 1984). When the opcode is NX_TFTP_CODE_ERROR the message string is copied with a loop whose only limits are the destination buffer and a NUL byte: ```c /* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_client.c:1769 */ for (i = 0; (i < (sizeof(tftp_client_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_error_string) - 1)) && (*buffer_ptr); i++) ``` Nothing compares `buffer_ptr` against `nx_packet_append_ptr`. An ERROR packet that carries no terminating NUL, which a server controls completely, walks the loop off the end of the packet until it happens to meet a zero byte or fills the 64 byte destination. ``` ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 1 at 0x60d0000000c8 thread T4 #0 _nxd_tftp_client_file_read addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_client.c:1769 0x60d0000000c8 is 0 bytes to the right of 136-byte region ``` The open path has the same loop at :1327 and reports the same way. What is read lands in `nx_tftp_client_error_string`, which the application is expected to display or log, so adjacent packet pool memory ends up in whatever the device does with the error text. Add `(buffer_ptr < packet_ptr -> nx_packet_append_ptr)` to the loop condition in all three paths.

Timeline

  1. CVE published
  2. CISA SSVC assessment

    Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial

  3. Record last updated

Affected versions

  • NetX Duo

    through 6.5.1

References 1

GitHub · eclipse-threadx/netxduo