Nango: Production flow RBAC bypass on private flow-read routes
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.70.9
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Nango is an open-source platform for connecting agents and products to third-party APIs. Prior to 0.70.9, on accounts with RBAC enabled through a plan with has_rbac=true, two private flow-read routes, GET /api/v1/integrations/:providerConfigKey/flows and GET /api/v1/flow/:flowName, apply webAuth but omit can({ action: 'read', resource: 'flow', scopedBy: envScope }). A same-team user with the development_full_access role can therefore request env=prod and read production integration flow metadata or named flow configuration despite being denied by guarded production routes. Both controllers use res.locals.environment from the authenticated account, so the issue bypasses the production role boundary but does not cross tenant boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 0.70.9 and managed-1.5.11-0.70.8-aae30d044d7e229807d51a3957c212f3fb689e1a
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- NangoHQ nango
fixed in 0.70.9