wsl-pro-service: Ubuntu Pro token exposed via process command-line arguments
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.1.19ubuntu2, 0.1.18~24.04.3, 0.1.18~22.04.2, 0.1.18~20.04.2
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
In wsl-pro-service before 0.1.19ubuntu3, the service component which runs as root inside each WSL instance attaches the instance to Ubuntu Pro by executing the pro client with the Ubuntu Pro token passed as a command-line argument (pro attach <token>). On systems where /proc is mounted without process-hiding mitigations (such as hidepid), which is the default in WSL, an unprivileged local user or process in the same WSL instance can read the token from /proc/<pid>/cmdline while the attach process is running. The leaked token could then be used to attach other machines to the victim's Ubuntu Pro subscription and gain unauthorized access to Ubuntu Pro services.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- wsl-pro-service
From 0.1.1 · fixed in 0.1.19ubuntu2; From 0.1.1 · fixed in 0.1.18~24.04.3; From 0.1.1 · fixed in 0.1.18~22.04.2; From 0.1.1 · fixed in 0.1.18~20.04.2