Physical UART Access Leading to an Unauthenticated Root Shell in TP-Link Kasa EC70 and EC71
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.4.3 Build 20260902 rel.4511
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Kasa EC70 v4 and EC71 v4 do not logically disable the production debug interface at the firmware or chip level and do not lock the bootloader. Although the debug traces are physically severed during manufacturing, an attacker with physical access can restore the connection, interrupt the boot process, and manipulate boot parameters to enter a non-standard initialization path that exposes an unauthenticated root shell during startup. Successful exploitation may allow an attacker with physical access to obtain root-level command access during device startup, resulting in loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for the affected device. Exploitation requires device disassembly, restoration of the severed debug connection, and manipulation of the boot process.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- TP-Link Systems Inc. Kasa EC70 V4
fixed in 2.4.3 Build 20260902 rel.4511
- TP-Link Systems Inc. Kasa EC71 V4
fixed in 2.4.3 Build 20260902 rel.4511