pnpm 11.0.0 before 11.11.0 Environment Variable Exfiltration via Proxy Settings
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 11.11.0, 10.34.5
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
pnpm versions 11.0.0 before 11.11.0 and 10.7.0 before 10.34.5 expand ${VAR} environment-variable placeholders in the httpProxy, httpsProxy, and noProxy settings read from a project's pnpm-workspace.yaml. Because the manifest is repository-controlled and the proxy keys were omitted from the request-destination key set that otherwise suppresses placeholder expansion for untrusted manifests (as already done for registry, pnprServer, registries and namedRegistries), an attacker who controls a repository's pnpm-workspace.yaml can cause a victim who clones the repository and runs a pnpm command (e.g. pnpm install) to expand environment secrets such as NPM_TOKEN or GITHUB_TOKEN into a proxy hostname or userinfo and route install traffic — and the corresponding DNS lookups — through an attacker-controlled host. The exfiltration occurs during configuration loading, before any lifecycle script executes. Fixed in pnpm 11.11.0 and 10.34.5.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- pnpm pnpm
From 11.0.0 · fixed in 11.11.0
- pnpm pnpm
From 10.7.0 · fixed in 10.34.5
- pnpmnpm
From 11.0.0 · fixed in 11.11.0
- pnpmnpm
From 10.7.0 · fixed in 10.34.5