Flowise through 3.1.4 Authorization Bypass via BullMQ Dashboard
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Flowise through 3.1.4 does not enforce authorization on the BullMQ admin dashboard. When the server runs in queue mode with the dashboard enabled and not in cloud mode (MODE=queue, ENABLE_BULLMQ_DASHBOARD=true, and !isCloud()), the /admin/queues mount is protected only by the verifyTokenForBullMQDashboard middleware, which validates the JWT but performs no role, permission, or workspace/organization scoping check; the mount also lies outside /api/v1/* so the global API gate does not apply. As a result, any authenticated user — including the lowest-privileged member of any tenant — can reach the full Bull-Board UI and view all queues and job payloads across the entire instance, including chat inputs and overrideConfig (which may carry credentials and prompts), chatflow.flowData graph definitions with custom function source code, credential IDs and system prompts, chatIds, files, and the originating orgId/workspaceId. The dashboard's write actions (retry, remove, promote, clean) are likewise usable across tenants. No patched version is available as of the advisory.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- FlowiseAI Flowise
through 3.1.4