ClawHub before 8c2de6c506 Quota Exhaustion via Anonymous API
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fix or patch referenced
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
ClawHub (the openclaw/clawhub application/backend) does not bind anonymous HTTP API requests to a trusted caller identity, so all direct anonymous API requests share a single default quota allowance. A remote, unauthenticated caller can drain that shared allowance and thereby deny or degrade API access for unrelated visitors. In addition, when the TRUST_FORWARDED_IPS option is enabled without an authenticated edge/proxy, clients can supply arbitrary forwarded IP headers to select quota identities of their choosing and evade rate limiting. The issue was confirmed at revision cbfee7343ddc867316dd9b3de6fa8856730f9f41; the complete historical affected range was not established. It is fixed in revision 8c2de6c506bb4efabe3f0c2ffb8370b9e23d4650 (PR #3684), where direct anonymous calls are redirected to the public API origin without consuming quota and forged identity assertions return HTTP 401. The npm CLI and OpenClaw runtime are separate products and are not affected.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- openclaw clawhub
fixed in 8c2de6c506bb4efabe3f0c2ffb8370b9e23d4650