Timing side-channel in SM2 algorithm on 64 bit ARM
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.5.4, 3.4.3, 3.3.5, 3.2.6
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Issue summary: A timing side-channel which could potentially allow remote recovery of the private key exists in the SM2 algorithm implementation on 64 bit ARM platforms. Impact summary: A timing side-channel in SM2 signature computations on 64 bit ARM platforms could allow recovering the private key by an attacker.. While remote key recovery over a network was not attempted by the reporter, timing measurements revealed a timing signal which may allow such an attack. OpenSSL does not directly support certificates with SM2 keys in TLS, and so this CVE is not relevant in most TLS contexts. However, given that it is possible to add support for such certificates via a custom provider, coupled with the fact that in such a custom provider context the private key may be recoverable via remote timing measurements, we consider this to be a Moderate severity issue. The FIPS modules in 3.5, 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue, as SM2 is not an approved algorithm.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- OpenSSL OpenSSL
From 3.5.0 · fixed in 3.5.4; From 3.4.0 · fixed in 3.4.3; From 3.3.0 · fixed in 3.3.5; From 3.2.0 · fixed in 3.2.6