Unexpected session resumption in crypto/tls
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.24.13, 1.25.7, 1.26.0-rc.3
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: total
Summary
During session resumption in crypto/tls, if the underlying Config has its ClientCAs or RootCAs fields mutated between the initial handshake and the resumed handshake, the resumed handshake may succeed when it should have failed. This may happen when a user calls Config.Clone and mutates the returned Config, or uses Config.GetConfigForClient. This can cause a client to resume a session with a server that it would not have resumed with during the initial handshake, or cause a server to resume a session with a client that it would not have resumed with during the initial handshake.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- crypto/tls
fixed in 1.24.13; From 1.25.0-0 · fixed in 1.25.7; From 1.26.0-rc.1 · fixed in 1.26.0-rc.3
- stdlibGo
fixed in 1.24.13; From 1.25.0-0 · fixed in 1.25.7; From 1.26.0-rc.1 · fixed in 1.26.0-rc.3