SNMP Command Injection leads to RCE in Cacti
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.2.29
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. Prior to 1.2.29, there is an input-validation flaw in the SNMP device configuration functionality. An authenticated Cacti user can supply crafted SNMP community strings containing control characters (including newlines) that are accepted, stored verbatim in the database, and later embedded into backend SNMP operations. In environments where downstream SNMP tooling or wrappers interpret newline-separated tokens as command boundaries, this can lead to unintended command execution with the privileges of the Cacti process. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.2.29.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
- EPSS reached 10%
FIRST estimates at least a 10% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days
Affected versions
- Cacti cacti
fixed in 1.2.29