Alloy Core has a DoS vulnerability on `alloy_dyn_abi::TypedData` hashing
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.8.26, 1.4.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Alloy Core libraries at the root of the Rust Ethereum ecosystem. Prior to 0.8.26 and 1.4.1, an uncaught panic triggered by malformed input to alloy_dyn_abi::TypedData could lead to a denial-of-service (DoS) via eip712_signing_hash(). Software with high availability requirements such as network services may be particularly impacted. If in use, external auto-restarting mechanisms can partially mitigate the availability issues unless repeated attacks are possible. The vulnerability was patched by adding a check to ensure the element is not empty before accessing its first element; an error is returned if it is empty. The fix is included in version v1.4.1 and backported to v0.8.26.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- alloy-rs core
fixed in 0.8.26; From 1.0.0 · fixed in 1.4.1
- alloy-dyn-abicrates.io
fixed in 0.8.26
- alloy-dyn-abicrates.io
From 1.0.0 · fixed in 1.4.1
- alloy-dyn-abicrates.io
From 0.0.0-0 · fixed in 0.8.26; From 1.0.0 · fixed in 1.4.1