Linkr allows manifest tampering leading to arbitrary file injection
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.0.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
Linkr is a lightweight file delivery system that downloads files from a webserver. Linkr versions through 2.0.0 do not verify the integrity or authenticity of .linkr manifest files before using their contents, allowing a tampered manifest to inject arbitrary file entries into a package distribution. An attacker can modify a generated .linkr manifest (for example by adding a new entry with a malicious URL) and when a user runs the extract command the client downloads the attacker-supplied file without verification. This enables arbitrary file injection and creates a potential path to remote code execution if a downloaded malicious binary or script is later executed. Version 2.0.1 adds a manifest integrity check that compares the checksum of the original author-created manifest to the one being extracted and aborts on mismatch, warning if no original manifest is hosted. Users should update to 2.0.1 or later. As a workaround prior to updating, use only trusted .linkr manifests, manually verify manifest integrity, and host manifests on trusted servers.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- mohammadzain2008 Linkr
fixed in 2.0.1