Netty is vulnerable to request smuggling due to incorrect parsing of chunk extensions
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 4.2.5.Final, 4.1.125.Final
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.1.124.Final, and 4.2.0.Alpha3 through 4.2.4.Final, Netty incorrectly accepts standalone newline characters (LF) as a chunk-size line terminator, regardless of a preceding carriage return (CR), instead of requiring CRLF per HTTP/1.1 standards. When combined with reverse proxies that parse LF differently (treating it as part of the chunk extension), attackers can craft requests that the proxy sees as one request but Netty processes as two, enabling request smuggling attacks. This is fixed in versions 4.1.125.Final and 4.2.5.Final.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- netty netty
From 4.2.0.Alpha3 · fixed in 4.2.5.Final; fixed in 4.1.125.Final · through 4.1.124.Final
- io.netty:netty-codec-httpMaven
fixed in 4.1.125.Final
- io.netty:netty-codec-httpMaven
From 4.2.0.Alpha1 · fixed in 4.2.5.Final