OpenBao: Privileged Operator May Execute Code on the Underlying Host
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.3.2, 0.0.0-20250806194004-a14053c9679d
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
OpenBao exists to provide a software solution to manage, store, and distribute sensitive data including secrets, certificates, and keys. In versions 2.3.1 and below, some OpenBao deployments intentionally limit privileged API operators from executing system code or making network connections. However, these operators can bypass both restrictions through the audit subsystem by manipulating log prefixes. This allows unauthorized code execution and network access that violates the intended security model. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.2. To workaround, users can block access to sys/audit/* endpoints using explicit deny policies, but root operators cannot be restricted this way.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- openbao openbao
fixed in 2.3.2
- github.com/openbao/openbaoGo
From 0.1.0 · fixed in 2.3.2
- github.com/openbao/openbaoGo
fixed in 0.0.0-20250806194004-a14053c9679d
- github.com/openbao/openbaoGo
fixed in 0.0.0-20250806194004-a14053c9679d; From 0.1.0