Skip to main content
← All vulnerabilities
CVE-2025-47277PYSEC-2026-567GHSA-HJQ4-87XH-G4FV

vLLM Allows Remote Code Execution via PyNcclPipe Communication Service

Published
Last modified
published
Not listed in CISA KEV
Fix
Fixed in 0.8.5
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
  • Exploitation: none
  • Automatable: yes
  • Technical impact: total

Summary

vLLM, an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs), has an issue in versions 0.6.5 through 0.8.4 that ONLY impacts environments using the `PyNcclPipe` KV cache transfer integration with the V0 engine. No other configurations are affected. vLLM supports the use of the `PyNcclPipe` class to establish a peer-to-peer communication domain for data transmission between distributed nodes. The GPU-side KV-Cache transmission is implemented through the `PyNcclCommunicator` class, while CPU-side control message passing is handled via the `send_obj` and `recv_obj` methods on the CPU side.​ The intention was that this interface should only be exposed to a private network using the IP address specified by the `--kv-ip` CLI parameter. The vLLM documentation covers how this must be limited to a secured network. The default and intentional behavior from PyTorch is that the `TCPStore` interface listens on ALL interfaces, regardless of what IP address is provided. The IP address given was only used as a client-side address to use. vLLM was fixed to use a workaround to force the `TCPStore` instance to bind its socket to a specified private interface. As of version 0.8.5, vLLM limits the `TCPStore` socket to the private interface as configured.

Timeline

  1. CVE published
  2. CISA SSVC assessment

    Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total

  3. Record last updated

Affected versions

  • vllm-project vllm

    From 0.6.5 · fixed in 0.8.5

  • vllmPyPI

    From 0.6.5 · fixed in 0.8.5

References 4

GitHub · vllm-project/vllm

docs.vllm.ai