vsock/virtio: Validate length in packet header before skb_put()
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 6.1.149, 6.6.103, 6.12.44, 6.16.4
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock/virtio: Validate length in packet header before skb_put() When receiving a vsock packet in the guest, only the virtqueue buffer size is validated prior to virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put(). Unfortunately, virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put() uses the length from the packet header as the length argument to skb_put(), potentially resulting in SKB overflow if the host has gone wonky. Validate the length as advertised by the packet header before calling virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put().
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
From baddcc2c71572968cdaeee1c4ab3dc0ad90fa765 · fixed in 969b06bd8b7560efb100a34227619e7d318fbe05; From 71dc9ec9ac7d3eee785cdc986c3daeb821381e20 · fixed in ee438c492b2e0705d819ac0e25d04fae758d8f8f; From 71dc9ec9ac7d3eee785cdc986c3daeb821381e20 · fixed in faf332a10372390ce65d0b803888f4b25a388335; From 71dc9ec9ac7d3eee785cdc986c3daeb821381e20 · fixed in 676f03760ca1d69c2470cef36c44dc152494b47c; From 71dc9ec9ac7d3eee785cdc986c3daeb821381e20 · fixed in 0dab92484474587b82e8e0455839eaf5ac7bf894; From 6.1.63 · fixed in 6.1.149
- Linux Linux
6.3
- KernelLinux
fixed in 6.1.149; From 6.2.0 · fixed in 6.6.103; From 6.3.0 · fixed in 6.12.44; From 6.7.0 · fixed in 6.16.4