ses's global contour bindings leak into Compartment lexical scope
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.12.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
SES safely executes third-party JavaScript 'strict' mode programs in compartments that have no excess authority in their global scope. Prior to version 1.12.0, web pages and web extensions using `ses` and the Compartment API to evaluate third-party code in an isolated execution environment that have also elsewhere used `const`, `let`, and `class` bindings in the top-level scope of a `<script>` tag will have inadvertently revealed these bindings in the lexical scope of third-party code. This issue has been patched in version 1.12.0. Workarounds for this issue involve either avoiding top-level `let`, `const`, or `class` bindings in `<script>` tags, or change these to `var` bindings to be reflected on `globalThis`.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- endojs endo
fixed in 1.12.0
- sesnpm
fixed in 1.12.0