can: ucan: fix out of bound read in strscpy() source

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: ucan: fix out of bound read in strscpy() source Commit 7fdaf8966aae ("can: ucan: use strscpy() to instead of strncpy()") unintentionally introduced a one byte out of bound read on strscpy()'s source argument (which is kind of ironic knowing that strscpy() is meant to be a more secure alternative :)). Let's consider below buffers: dest[len + 1]; /* will be NUL terminated */ src[len]; /* may not be NUL terminated */ When doing: strncpy(dest, src, len); dest[len] = '\0'; strncpy() will read up to len bytes from src. On the other hand: strscpy(dest, src, len + 1); will read up to len + 1 bytes from src, that is to say, an out of bound read of one byte will occur on src if it is not NUL terminated. Note that the src[len] byte is never copied, but strscpy() still needs to read it to check whether a truncation occurred or not. This exact pattern happened in ucan. The root cause is that the source is not NUL terminated. Instead of doing a copy in a local buffer, directly NUL terminate it as soon as usb_control_msg() returns. With this, the local firmware_str[] variable can be removed. On top of this do a couple refactors: • ucan_ctl_payload->raw is only used for the firmware string, so rename it to ucan_ctl_payload->fw_str and change its type from u8 to char. • ucan_device_request_in() is only used to retrieve the firmware string, so rename it to ucan_get_fw_str() and refactor it to make it directly handle all the string termination logic.

Timeline

1. Apr 3, 2025, 7:19 AM UTCCVE published
2. Oct 1, 2025, 5:09 PM UTCCISA SSVC assessment

   Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial

3. May 11, 2026, 9:10 PM UTCRecord last updated

Affected versions

• Linux Linux

  Version range not reported

• Linux Linux

  6.2

References 4