wifi: nl80211: reject cooked mode if it is set along with other flags
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: nl80211: reject cooked mode if it is set along with other flags It is possible to set both MONITOR_FLAG_COOK_FRAMES and MONITOR_FLAG_ACTIVE flags simultaneously on the same monitor interface from the userspace. This causes a sub-interface to be created with no IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER bit set because the monitor interface is in the cooked state and it takes precedence over all other states. When the interface is then being deleted the kernel calls WARN_ONCE() from check_sdata_in_driver() because of missing that bit. Fix this by rejecting MONITOR_FLAG_COOK_FRAMES if it is set along with other flags. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Linux Linux
Version range not reported
- Linux Linux
2.6.26
References 8
git.kernel.org
- stable/c/5ea856d93794c4afa5542defd8c61f2708dc245a
- stable/c/351eb7ac53ff1cd94d893c0c4534ced2f36ae7d7
- stable/c/cd1bdcb77fdc03c253137e55bae10551b3481461
- stable/c/236f41ca728f23210b31ed2d1d8a6df575a4b2d6
- stable/c/ebebbb0eded2ed9a1abfa31962f6fb699e6abce7
- stable/c/521e55c2b0d6028861ac0a2d06aa57bb0e3ac486
- stable/c/ac4860141300581d3e2f6c6dafa37220f7ea9f65
- stable/c/49f27f29446a5bfe633dd2cc0cfebd48a1a5e77f