Lack of JWT issuer and signer validation
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
The AWS ALB Route Directive Adapter For Istio repo https://github.com/awslabs/aws-alb-route-directive-adapter-for-istio/tree/master provides an OIDC authentication mechanism that was integrated into the open source Kubeflow project. The adapter uses JWT for authentication, but lacks proper signer and issuer validation. In deployments of ALB that ignore security best practices, where ALB targets are directly exposed to internet traffic, an actor can provide a JWT signed by an untrusted entity in order to spoof OIDC-federated sessions and successfully bypass authentication. The repository/package has been deprecated, is end of life, and is no longer supported. As a security best practice, ensure that your ELB targets (e.g. EC2 Instances, Fargate Tasks etc.) do not have public IP addresses. Ensure any forked or derivative code validate that the signer attribute in the JWT match the ARN of the Application Load Balancer that the service is configured to use.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- aws-alb-route-directive-adapter-for-istio
1.0, 1.1
- github.com/awslabs/aws-alb-route-directive-adapter-for-istioGo
All versions