HPACK table poisoning in gRPC C++, Python & Ruby
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
It's possible for a gRPC client communicating with a HTTP/2 proxy to poison the HPACK table between the proxy and the backend such that other clients see failed requests. It's also possible to use this vulnerability to leak other clients HTTP header keys, but not values. This occurs because the error status for a misencoded header is not cleared between header reads, resulting in subsequent (incrementally indexed) added headers in the first request being poisoned until cleared from the HPACK table. Please update to a fixed version of gRPC as soon as possible. This bug has been fixed in 1.58.3, 1.59.5, 1.60.2, 1.61.3, 1.62.3, 1.63.2, 1.64.3, 1.65.4.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Google gRPC
1.53.0, 1.53.1, 1.53.2, 1.54.0, 1.54.1, 1.54.3, 1.55.0, 1.55.1, 1.55.3, 1.55.4, 1.56.0, 1.56.1, 1.56.2, 1.56.3, 1.56.4, 1.57.0, 1.57.1, 1.58.0, 1.58.1, 1.58.2, 1.59.0, 1.59.1, 1.59.2, 1.59.3, 1.59.4, 1.60.0, 1.60.1, 1.61.0, 1.61.1, 1.62.0, and 12 more