Apache MINA: MINA applications using unbounded deserialization may allow RCE
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.2.4, 2.1.10, 2.0.27
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: total
Summary
The ObjectSerializationDecoder in Apache MINA uses Java’s native deserialization protocol to process incoming serialized data but lacks the necessary security checks and defenses. This vulnerability allows attackers to exploit the deserialization process by sending specially crafted malicious serialized data, potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE) attacks. This issue affects MINA core versions 2.0.X, 2.1.X and 2.2.X, and will be fixed by the releases 2.0.27, 2.1.10 and 2.2.4. It's also important to note that an application using MINA core library will only be affected if the IoBuffer#getObject() method is called, and this specific method is potentially called when adding a ProtocolCodecFilter instance using the ObjectSerializationCodecFactory class in the filter chain. If your application is specifically using those classes, you have to upgrade to the latest version of MINA core library. Upgrading will not be enough: you also need to explicitly allow the classes the decoder will accept in the ObjectSerializationDecoder instance, using one of the three new methods: /** * Accept class names where the supplied ClassNameMatcher matches for • deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected. * • @param classNameMatcher the matcher to use */ public void accept(ClassNameMatcher classNameMatcher) /** • Accept class names that match the supplied pattern for • deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected. * • @param pattern standard Java regexp */ public void accept(Pattern pattern) /** • Accept the wildcard specified classes for deserialization, • unless they are otherwise rejected. * • @param patterns Wildcard file name patterns as defined by • {@link org.apache.commons.io.FilenameUtils#wildcardMatch(String, String) FilenameUtils.wildcardMatch} */ public void accept(String... patterns) By default, the decoder will reject all classes that will be present in the incoming data. Note: The FtpServer, SSHd and Vysper sub-project are not affected by this issue.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
- EPSS reached 10%
FIRST estimates at least a 10% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days
Affected versions
- org.apache.mina:mina-core
From 2.1 · through 2.1.9; From 2.2 · through 2.2.3
- org.apache.mina:mina-coreMaven
From 2.2.0 · fixed in 2.2.4
- org.apache.mina:mina-coreMaven
From 2.1.0 · fixed in 2.1.10
- org.apache.mina:mina-coreMaven
From 2.0.0-M1 · fixed in 2.0.27