Apache CloudStack: SAML Signature Exclusion
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- 1 proof of concept on GitHub, 1 Nuclei template
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
The CloudStack SAML authentication (disabled by default) does not enforce signature check. In CloudStack environments where SAML authentication is enabled, an attacker that initiates CloudStack SAML single sign-on authentication can bypass SAML authentication by submitting a spoofed SAML response with no signature and known or guessed username and other user details of a SAML-enabled CloudStack user-account. In such environments, this can result in a complete compromise of the resources owned and/or accessible by a SAML enabled user-account. Affected users are recommended to disable the SAML authentication plugin by setting the "saml2.enabled" global setting to "false", or upgrade to version 4.18.2.2, 4.19.1.0 or later, which addresses this issue.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
- EPSS reached 10%
FIRST estimates at least a 10% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days
Affected versions
- Apache Software Foundation Apache CloudStack
From 4.5.0 · through 4.18.2.1; From 4.19.0.0 · through 4.19.0.2