@grpc/grpc-js can allocate memory for incoming messages well above configured limits
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.10.9, 1.9.15, 1.8.22
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
@grpc/grps-js implements the core functionality of gRPC purely in JavaScript, without a C++ addon. Prior to versions 1.10.9, 1.9.15, and 1.8.22, there are two separate code paths in which memory can be allocated per message in excess of the `grpc.max_receive_message_length` channel option: If an incoming message has a size on the wire greater than the configured limit, the entire message is buffered before it is discarded; and/or if an incoming message has a size within the limit on the wire but decompresses to a size greater than the limit, the entire message is decompressed into memory, and on the server is not discarded. This has been patched in versions 1.10.9, 1.9.15, and 1.8.22.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- grpc grpc-node
From 1.10.0 · fixed in 1.10.9; From 1.9.0 · fixed in 1.9.15; fixed in 1.8.22
- @grpc/grpc-jsnpm
From 1.10.0 · fixed in 1.10.9
- @grpc/grpc-jsnpm
From 1.9.0 · fixed in 1.9.15
- @grpc/grpc-jsnpm
fixed in 1.8.22