Denial of service/high operating costs through unauthenticated downloads in Matrix Media Repo
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.3.5
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Matrix Media Repo (MMR) is a highly configurable multi-homeserver media repository for Matrix. MMR before version 1.3.5 is vulnerable to unbounded disk consumption, where an unauthenticated adversary can induce it to download and cache large amounts of remote media files. MMR's typical operating environment uses S3-like storage as a backend, with file-backed store as an alternative option. Instances using a file-backed store or those which self-host an S3 storage system are therefore vulnerable to a disk fill attack. Once the disk is full, authenticated users will be unable to upload new media, resulting in denial of service. For instances configured to use a cloud-based S3 storage option, this could result in high service fees instead of a denial of service. MMR 1.3.5 introduces a new default-on "leaky bucket" rate limit to reduce the amount of data a user can request at a time. This does not fully address the issue, but does limit an unauthenticated user's ability to request large amounts of data. Operators should note that the leaky bucket implementation introduced in MMR 1.3.5 requires the IP address associated with the request to be forwarded, to avoid mistakenly applying the rate limit to the reverse proxy instead. To avoid this issue, the reverse proxy should populate the X-Forwarded-For header when sending the request to MMR. Operators who cannot update may wish to lower the maximum file size they allow and implement harsh rate limits, though this can still lead to a large amount of data to be downloaded.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- t2bot matrix-media-repo
fixed in 1.3.5
- github.com/t2bot/matrix-media-repoGo
fixed in 1.3.5